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BROWNFIELD INITIATIVES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: SECOND-CLASS CLEANUPS OR MARKET-
BASED EQUITY?
KIRSTEN H. ENGEL*
Two movements are currently challenging long-established
practices in the siting, permitting, and cleanup of polluting businesses
and activities: the environmental justice movement and the urban
redevelopment movement typified by state voluntary cleanup or
"brownfields" laws. Under the former, efforts are being made to
identify and reverse the environmental policies responsible for shifting
a disproportionate share of the pollution burdens of our industrial
society onto members of racial and ethnic minority groups and the
poor.' Under the latter, states and localities, with the federal
government's approval, are encouraging developers to locate new
businesses on contaminated sites by releasing such developers from the
more stringent environmental cleanup and liability standards that might
otherwise apply.2 The two movements overlap where such incentives
*Associate Professor, Tulane Law School. J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law, 1986; B.A., Brown University, 1983. I would like to thank Laura Steinberg, Scott Saleska
and Robert Kuehn for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am grateful for the research
assistance of Noel Wolfe and the hard work of Michael Healy and the student organizers of the
Brownfields Symposium at the University of Kentucky College of Law.
'Review of a large number of empirical studies point to the conclusion that people of
color and lower incomes face disproportionate environmental impacts in the United States. See
BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN, NOT JUST PROSPERITY: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1994) (all but one of 64 empirical studies reviewed found
environmental disparities either by race or income, regardless of the kind of environmental concern
or level of geographic specificity studied). Studies demonstrate that hazardous waste and other
environmentally noxious facilities are disproportionately located in communities in which the
residents are poor and belong to a racial minority. See General Accounting Office, SITING OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS
OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES, GAO/RCED-95-84, 1-2 (1983); COMMISSION FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1987);
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. EPA, 230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY:
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 11-16 (1992).2
As will be explained subsequently in the text, state voluntary cleanup laws govern the
removal or containment of hazardous contaminants at brownfield sites. As a general matter, such
laws aie less stringent than the federal waste cleanup law, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), also known as "Superfund." 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75. See infra text accompanying notes 11-23. For a fairly up-to-date list of state
voluntary cleanup statutes and regulations, see Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?:
Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883,
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are used to foster redevelopment of contaminated sites in poor minority
communities, where the overwhelming number of brownfield projects
are located.' The question is, are the goals of the two movements
consistent, or do they work at cross purposes with each other?
To some, brownfield redevelopment and environmental justice
are synonymous. Indeed, some government agencies appear to claim
that their brownfield projects enhance the goals of environmental
equity.4 Similarly, supporters contend that state voluntary cleanup laws
are fully consistent with environmental justice concerns.5 To them, the
concessions made to developers under such laws are worth it, given that
the sites are not sufficiently contaminated to trigger the stringent federal
cleanup requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).6 Brownfield supporters
contend that such concessions are needed to help replace abandoned
contaminated sites with new industrial, commercial or other uses that
will provide direct or spillover economic opportunities to the local
community.7 In fact, some advocates fear that federal policies
prohibiting state environmental permits that may result in a
disproportionate environmental impact by race or ethnicity will actually
undermine environmental justice goals by discouraging brownfield
redevelopment projects!
1033-39 app. (1996).
3See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 2, at 895 ("[B]rownflelds are conspicuous symbols of the
decline of lower-income and minority neighborhoods in which they are overwhelmingly located.");
Kris Wemstedt and Robert Hersh, "Through a Lens Darkly"- Superfund Spectacles on Public
Participation at Brownfield Sites, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 153, 160 (1998); ("Many
brownfield sites lie in poor and minority communities.").
4See, e.g., the U.S. EPA's brownfields website:
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/ejaa96/execsum.htm>. See also Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness
in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 716 (1997) ('The Brownfields initiative is plainly the
Agency's most visible effort to marry the concerns of environmental protection and environmental
justice."); U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A DEPARTMENTAL STRATEGY,
Mar. 24, 1997 (listing brownfields redevelopment as one of the Department's "priority initiatives"
for environmental justice).
5See, e.g., E. Lynn Grayson, An Alliance ofNecessity: Envirojustice and Brownfields,
6 ENVW'L COMPLIANCE & LrTio. STRATEGY 4 (1998) ("Brownfields and environmental justice
proponents share common goals and objectives so that each initiative may progress without
negatively affecting the other").
642 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1996).
7Stephanie B. Gridberg, Let's Make a Deal, 83 A.B.A. J. 42 (March 1997) (quoting
supporters of Brownfield redevelopment projects).
'Thus, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, at the urging of Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer,
has sharply criticized the U.S. EPA's interim guidance for processing administrative complaints
filed under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as harmful to brownfields redevelopment. See
Jim Barrett, Environmental Justice: A Bad Policy, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 15, 1998
(editorial). EPA's interim policy describes the procedures the agency will use to decide complaints
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To others, however, the application of state voluntary cleanup
laws to urban brownfield sites could be considered manifestly
inconsistent with many of the articulated goals and principles of the
environmental justice movement. Brownfield cleanups tend to be less
complete than cleanups conducted under the federal Superfund law, and
new site owners often require relief from future liability as a
precondition of their expenditure of cleanup funds. As a result,
brownfield cleanups arguably "lock in" the contamination legacy of
past industrial development and provide "second-class" cleanup
remedies for persons who have long been treated as "second-class"
citizens for purposes of the distribution of environmental hazards.
Moreover, concessions made as part of a voluntary cleanup program are
likely irreversible. Once a community accepts lower cleanup standards
or the immunity of current owners from liability for cleanup costs based
upon the expected future redevelopment of the site for an industrial use,
the site may never be cleaned up to levels that would support a full
range of future uses of the property, including residential, educational,
and recreational uses. Thus, in the name of the economic development
so desperately needed in urban areas, brownfield programs may dash
the hopes of eliminating the association between urban majority-
minority neighborhoods and disproportionate exposure to
environmental hazards. According to a worst case scenario, the
enticement of new industrial development to the inner cities may further
concentrate environmental hazards in urban areas, compounding the
already disproportionate number of such facilities in urban minority
neighborhoods.
In sum, while the redevelopment of brownfield sites
unquestionably responds to some environmental justice concerns, the
legal framework of state and federal brownfleld initiatives also conflicts
alleging that a state or local environmental permitting decision will have a radically discriminatory
effect by, for example, imposing a disproportionate pollution burden upon a racial or ethnic
minority. U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (Feb. 5, 1998). According to the mayors, some state
officials, industry representatives, and others, EPA's policy will discourage developers from siting
new industries in minority communities that need environmental permits- Id. See also
Environmental Justice Policy to Hurt Brownfields, Superfund Revitalization, HAZ. WASTE NEWS
(Oct 5, 1998); Green Racism, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at AI8 (editorial).
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with many other goals of the environmental justice movement.9
Brownfields' uneven scorecard leaves those genuinely concerned about
environmental justice with something of a dilemma. How do such
persons view the brownfield programs rapidly being adopted by state
and local governments? Do such programs further or detract from the
gains being made in administering environmental protection in a
manner that is equitable according to the race and income of the persons
and communities involved?
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question. The
meaning of "environmental justice" and the best method of achieving
it are subject to a range of interpretations. Because the environmental
justice movement resists being "pigeon-holed," it is not possible to give
a single answer to the question of whether environmental justice is
consistent with state brownfield initiatives. One method of dealing with
this ambiguity is to view the goals of environmental justice through the
lens of the competing approaches to its implementation. Depending
upon the approach adopted, state brownfield programs are of varying
degrees of consistency with environmental justice.
For instance, according to the "rights-based" approach, the
community living beside the contaminated site has the "right" to be
provided with cleanup and liability standards without respect to their
racial make-up or collective income level. Because a large number of
the contaminated sites subject to brownfield cleanup programs are near
low-income and minority neighborhoods in urban centers, Brownfield
programs violate the rights-based conception of environmental justice
by providing minority and low income communities with less protective
hazardous waste cleanups.
On the other hand, according to the "market-based" approach,
brownfield initiatives represent an adaptation of hitherto inflexible
cleanup and liability standards to the economic development needs of
disadvantaged communities in today's inner cities. The market-based
'Recent literature on brownfields and environmental justice include: Paul Skanton
Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfelds, and Justice, 25 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv.
589 (1998); Patrick J. Skelley 11, Public Participation in Brownfield Remediation Systems:
Putting The Community Back on the (Zoning) Map, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 389 (1997);
Wernstedt and Hersh, supra note 6, at 153; Eisen, supra note 2; Georgette C. Poindexter,
Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft
LegalProcess, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37 (1995); Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and
Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q.
705 (1994); Rodger C. Field, Siting, Justice, and the Environmental Law. 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
639 (1996); E. Lynn Grayson, Brownfields v. Enforcement Justice: Conflict or Concern, ABA
SONREEL Newsletter, Jan. 1996.
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approach likely views justice for disadvantaged communities better
served by attracting new economic opportunities, even at the expense
of less than perfect hazardous waste cleanups, than by leaving the
community with sites that may be contaminated and abandoned in
perpetuity.
In this Essay, I argue that, with respect to this specific issue of
brownfield redevelopment, neither the "market-based" nor the "rights-
based" approach should govern, but instead a third approach, labeled
here as a "pragmatic" approach to environmental justice, should be
followed in evaluating and seeking reforms to state brownfield
programs. The pragmatic approach emphasizes that the low levels of
contamination at brownfield sites render them unlikely targets of
federal Superfund cleanup efforts and therefore, in the absence of a
brownfield cleanup, the property is likely to remain contaminated and
abandoned. Hence, the pragmatic approach recognizes that the promise
of urban revitalization by private developers may be worth the less
extensive liability and cleanup scheme provided under state voluntary
cleanup laws. Nevertheless, because the pragmatic approach agrees
that all communities have the right to the same level of environmental
protection, the pragmatic approach views the choice of whether to
accept the less protective scheme provided in brownfield programs as
one that must be made with the consent of the local community.
Essentially, the pragmatic approach believes that, in the specific context
of brownfields, the local community should be able to trade-off the
more extensive cleanup and liability standards of brownfield programs
where they stand to gain considerable economic benefits in return. An
important component of the pragmatic approach is that programs that
fail to involve the local community in the process of deciding the extent
of the cleanup and liability at the brownfield site are manifestly
inconsistent with environmental justice.
I. COMPARING "STATE VOLUNTARY CLEANUP LAWS" TO SUPERFUND
A. State Voluntary Cleanup Laws
The legal framework of brownfield initiatives consists of state
voluntary cleanup programs and federal incentives designed to
encourage commercial developers to choose contaminated industrial
1997-98]
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sites ("brownfields") rather than uncontaminated suburban sites
("greenfields"). By reducing the extent of cleanup necessary at the site,
and by clarifying or mitigating the developer's liability for potential
future cleanup costs, states hope that their voluntary cleanup programs
will render existing contaminated urban sites attractive to cost-
conscious and liability-wary developers."
In order to have a basis for evaluating the relative stringency of
state voluntary cleanup laws, it is useful to review the standards that
apply to hazardous waste cleanups under the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA"), also known as the "Superfund" program. First,
CERCLA has been interpreted to impose expansive liability upon
nearly anyone who was involved in, or could arguably be considered
responsible for, the placement of hazardous contaminants at an
abandoned site. Consequently, liable parties under CERCLA, known
as "potentially responsible parties" or "PRPs," include current owners
of the property, past owners who owned the property at the time
hazardous substances were disposed of on the property, companies who
generated the substances found at the property, transporters who
transported the waste to the site, and even lenders who participated
actively in the management of the site." Liability under CERCLA is
strict, joint and several.' A PRP never entirely escapes from the net of
CERCLA liability, but remains liable in the event that the cleanup
remedy fails or additional contamination is discovered. Although the
federal government has some authority to grant PRPs' releases from
future liability, 3 actual use of such assurances is rare. 4
Yet, expansive liability is not the only issue that divides
CERCLA from state voluntary cleanup laws. Probably the most
important distinguishing characteristic is the nature of Superfund
"0See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 2, at 886-88.
"42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1996).
2See 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(32) (1996) (specifying that liability under CERCLA is the same
as that under section 311 of the Clean Water Act, which has been interpreted to impose strict
liability). For cases imposing joint and several liability under CERCLA, see United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (Ist Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985).
"See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (authorizing the federal government to "provide any person
with a covenant not to sue concerning any liability to the United States [under CERCLA],
including future liability").
"Frona M. Powell, Amending CERCL4 to Encourage the Redevelopment of




cleanups. CERCLA cleanups are known for their stringency; Congress
amended CERCLA in 1986 to specifically require that permanent
remedies that reduce the volume, mobility and toxicity of contamination
be preferred over temporary remedies, such as institutional controls
(e.g., deed restrictions), containment, or removal. 5 The 1986
Amendments also require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to adopt as cleanup standards those federal and state environmental
standards from other or similar media programs that are "applicable" or
"relevant and appropriate" (ARARs), as well as any state environmental
standards that are more stringent than the federal standards.' 6
Moreover, although the National Contingency Plan allows for the
stringency of CERCLA cleanup levels to be determined by the future
use of the site, the default standard is that of residential use.' 7
Extensive opportunities for public participation attend each step
of the CERCLA cleanup process. In addition to the usual round of
notice and comment procedures required under the Administrative
Procedure Act, CERCLA itself mandates that the federal or state
agency in charge of the cleanup must provide notice and accept public
comments on the proposed cleanup plan, publish the final plan, and, if
there exist any differences between any future remedial action,
settlement or enforcement action and the final cleanup plan, provide an
explanation of such differences."'
While critics claim that it is the very stringency of these
CERCLA requirements that has necessitated the development of state
brownfield programs,' 9 these requirements also provide a high level of
142 U.S.C. § 9621(b) ("Remedial actions in which treatment which permanently and
significantly reduces the volume, toxicity or mobility of the hazardous substances, pollutants and
contaminants is a principal element, are to be preferred over remedial actions not involving such
treatment."). See also National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R, § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (1996)
(description of a "CERCLA-quality" cleanup).
642 U.sC. § 9621 (d)(2)(A).
1740 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1996).
"8CERCLA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617.
9See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 2, at 899 ("From a developer's perspective, the list of
obstacles to brownfield redevelopment starts with the threat ofliability under CERCLA); Madeline
June Kass et al., Brownflelds: Where the Market Makes Green, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T.
345,348 (1998) ("Uncertain and unlimited liability probably represents the most notorious barrier
to brownfields redevelopment. Fear of joint, several and strict liability under federal and state
Superfund statutes deters prospective purchasers and investors otherwise interested in property
redevelopment.").
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protection of human health and the environment. In comparison to that
provided under CERCLA, the extent of liability and degree of cleanup
required under state voluntary cleanup laws is minimal. For example,
many state voluntary cleanup programs calibrate the stringency of the
site cleanup to the expected future use of the property, allowing the
property to be cleaned up to levels consistent with industrial use but not
necessarily residential use.20 Other state voluntary cleanup laws allow
or encourage the use of nonpermanent remedies which leave waste in
place but reduce the potential for exposure by installing a clay cap over
the contamination or by fencing contaminated areas.2' Still other states
certify that a cleanup is complete, thus providing the site owner with
some measure of assurance that the site will not require further cleanup
and, hence, the expenditure of additional costs.22 This is in contrast to
the stringent conditions imposed upon cleanups conducted under the
federal authority of CERCLA.23 CERCLA cleanups generally require
remediation to assume residential use, prefer permanent remedies (such
as the destruction of hazardous contaminants), and excuse potentially
liable parties, including current owners, only sparingly. Finally, under
most state voluntary cleanup laws, the most critical decisions are made
before the public is allowed to become involved in the brownfield
redevelopment project: the decision to develop the site, the decision as
to the proposed use of the site, and the proposed cleanup standard (i.e.,
2 The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that volunteers in 10 states are using
industrial land-use standards as the clean-up levels for at least half of the clean-ups at brownfield
sites. General Accounting Office, SUPERFUND: STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS PROVIDE
INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE CLEANUPS, GAO/RCED-97-66, 36. These ten states are California,
Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington
(ordered sites).
2 Id. at 37 tbl.3.6. According to the GAO, eight out of seventeen state voluntary
cleanup programs estimate that nonpermanent cleanup remedies were used to remove or stabilize
contamination at brownfield sites. These eight states are: California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, and Washington (ordered sites).
22Four states, Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota and Ohio, provide volunteers with a
covenant not to sue which provides that the state will not take any future enforcement action
against the volunteer once the cleanup is completed. Id at 31-33 tbl.3.3. Seven states, California,
Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, and Wisconsin, grant volunteers a "certificate of
completion" which simply states that the site has been cleaned up in accordance with the state's
standards. Id Some state certificates release the volunteer from future liability from past
contamination at the site. Id. Eleven state programs (California, Colorado, Illinois,
Massachusetts' one-year program, Massachusetts' longer-term program, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Tennessee, Washington Independent Remedial Action Program, Washington's ordered sites
program, and Wisconsin) grant volunteers a "no further action" letter which informs the volunteer
that the state does not anticipate that it will require any additional cleanup at the site. Id. For a
detailed description of the breaks and incentives contained in varying state voluntary cleanup laws,
see Eisen, supra note 2, at 915-79.
24 2 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
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whether contamination at the site will be cleaned up to levels consistent
with residential use, or only industrial use).24 In sum, state voluntary
cleanup laws applicable to brownfield sites allow for less extensive
cleanups and a smaller group of potentially liable parties than would be
allowed and provided for had the brownfield been subject to a federal
cleanup action under CERCLA.
But is the comparison between CERCLA and state voluntary
cleanup laws appropriate? Arguably, such a comparison is not
appropriate because state voluntary cleanup laws are intended to
address different types of sites from those addressed under CERCLA.
As opposed to highly contaminated sites posing grave dangers to health
and the environment, brownfield cleanup laws are meant to address
minimally contaminated sites posing minimal health and environmental
risks. Despite the apparent logic of this distinction, it is refuted by the
jurisdictional rules applicable to state voluntary cleanup programs.
According to the brownfield programs of many states, several sites that
are being cleaned up according to the more relaxed standards of state
voluntary cleanup programs also qualify for federal cleanup under
CERCLA. 5 Thus, the jurisdiction of CERCLA and state brownfield
programs overlap; a single site may be eligible for cleanup under either
program.
Yet, even if a site is technically eligible under both programs,
it might be argued that the comparison between the stringency of
federal CERCLA cleanup and liability standards and those of state
brownfield programs is still flawed because the vast majority of sites
subject to state brownfield programs are extremely unlikely to ever be
addressed under CERCLA. Regulations implementing CERCLA, as
well as state Superfund laws, limit CERCLA-quality cleanup and
liability to only the most hazardous sites presenting the most extreme
threats to human health and the environment.26 Thus, the theoretical
eligibility of the site for CERCLA cleanup is irrelevant; the reality is
"Eisen, supra note 2, at 1006.
"Fifteen out of seventeen states studied by the GAO reported that their program would
apply to sites that would qualify for federal CERCLA cleanup. GAO, supra note 20, at 28-29 tbl.
3.2.
'6See Eisen, supra note 2, at 901 (the majority of brownfield sites are not seriously
contaminated and thus are not listed on the federal National Priorities List or other lists of sites at
which a state or federal cleanup action is a high priority).
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that if not addressed under the brownfields program, such sites will
probably never be cleaned up at all. Focusing on this real life
constraint, however, obscures the equity issues underlying the
unavailability of CERCLA-quality remedies at brownfield sites. Most
importantly, it obscures the fact that the unavailability of CERCLA-
quality remedies at brownfield sites is a policy choice by agency
officials, and not a requirement of CERCLA itself. CERCLA merely
states that any "facility" where there has been a threatened or actual
release of a "hazardous substance" (or actual or threatened release of a
pollutant or contaminant which "may present an imminent or substantial
endangerment") qualifies for CERCLA cleanup.27 The policy choice is
that whatever financial and other resources are available under
CERCLA should be spent cleaning up sites presenting the greatest
overall risk to human health and the environment, wherever such sites
may be located, rather than cleaning up minimally-contaminated sites
posing low risks to residents of urban centers. Thus the comparison
between the quality and scope of CERCLA and state brownfield
cleanup and liability standards is not invalid just because the current
allocation of resources favors the cleanup of high-risk sites over urban
brownfields sites; allocation priorities could be changed, or resources
could be added to the Superfund cleanup program.
I. BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND VARYING CONCEPTIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
A. The "Rights-Based" Approach to Achieving Environmental Justice
1. The "Rights-Based" Critique of Brownfields Programs
The dominant thrust of environmental justice is that all persons
and communities, without regard to race or socio-economic status, are
entitled to equal treatment under the law concerning the distribution of
the environmental benefits and burdens of modem society.2" The
violation of this rights-based norm is the basis for the environmental
2742 U.S.C. § 9604.
"
8See PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE § 12 (Adopted at the First People of
Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Oct. 27, 1991, Washington, D-C.) ("Environmental
justice affirms the need for... providing fair access for all to the full range of resources"); ROBERT
D BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 7 (1990) ("All
Americans, white or black, rich or poor, are entitled to equal protection under the law. Just as this




justice movement which has galvanized around empirical studies
demonstrating that minority and low-income communities are
disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards, such as hazardous
waste landfills.2 9 The rights-based approach demands that state and
local govermnent agencies alter their siting and other environmental
policies so as to achieve substantive equity in the distribution of
environmental hazards by race and class and procedural equity in
environmental decision-making so as to include traditionally
disenfranchised groups such as minorities and the poor.
According to the rights-based conception of environmental
justice, brownfield programs that contemplate reduced cleanup
standards and less comprehensive liability by affected parties are
antithetical to the goal of substantive and procedural equality in the
distribution of environmental hazards across the lines of race, class, and
ethnicity. Under the rights-based conception, state voluntary cleanup
programs force the victims of environmental discrimination to bear the
costs of that discrimination. Due to the low land values prevailing in
their communities together with their relative political powerlessness,
poor and minority communities have been targeted historically as the
sites for heavy industrial development and, as a result, are subject to a
disproportionate share of the environmental hazards that frequently
accompany such development. Rather than reverse this legacy,
brownfield cleanups could actually perpetuate it. If, for example, the
cleanup of a brownfield site is sufficient only for future industrial uses,
the community will never escape this industrial legacy but will continue
to be located near potentially environmentally hazardous industrial
development.3" In this manner, the rights-based conception of
environmental justice could see brownfield initiatives as betraying the
promise of Superfund legislation which, at least for the sites that qualify
for Superfund remedies, would normally require more expensive
cleanups consistent with future residential and recreational uses of the
property.
29See supra note 1.
3See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the
Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CoNw. L. REV. 789,801
(1995) ("Differential clean-up standards, if set at a lower level than some 'ideal' standard, can
readily be characterized as continuing this discrimination against poor and minority communities,
shifting to them part of the costs of cleaning up Brownfields....").
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The benefits touted by brownfield initiatives would likely be
discounted by the rights-based environmental justice approach. The
increased economic opportunities that are to accompany brownfield
initiatives might be considered a "bribe" that asks residents to trade
health for dollars."
Moreover, the rights-based approach is likely to have little
sympathy for the objective of keeping industrial facilities from siting in
suburban or rural "greenfields." Such an objective can be seen as
contrary to environmental justice objectives in two senses. First,
channeling new industrial development back into the inner cities is
contrary to the objective of a more equal distribution of environmental
hazards. Second, paving the way for more industrial development could
also be seen as contrary to the goal of pollution prevention, a goal of
many environmental advocates who seek to reduce the total amount of
hazardous exposure.
2. "Rights-based" Solutions to the Problem of Abandoned
Contaminated Brownfield Sites
The "rights-based" environmental justice critique would likely
react to the very problems that have fostered state and federal
brownfield programs with a totally different set of initiatives. These
initiatives would stand in stark contrast to the more conciliatory set of
requirements that grow out of the more pragmatic conception of
environmental justice. "Rights-based" solutions might consist of: (1)
efforts to direct state and local agencies to intensify cleanup efforts in
urban industrial efforts such that even low level contaminated sites
receive government funds for cleanup; (2) efforts to reduce the
hazardous potential of new development projects through pollution
prevention programs; and (3) the more equal distribution of potentially
hazardous facilities between urban industrial areas and suburban areas.
Under the rights-based conception, the solution to the twin
problems of abandoned industrial sites and the disproportionate
distribution of environmental hazards in poor urban areas may be to
intensify efforts to clean up urban contaminated sites, rather than to
invite industrial redevelopment. According to this conception, the way
to reverse the pattern of environmental discrimination is to remove past
contamination and thus free urban minority areas from a cycle of
poverty and environmental hazards. Once cleaned up, urban
"See BULLARD, supra note 28, at 12.
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communities could attract nonhazardous land uses, such as residential
and recreational development which would generate economic
opportunities devoid of the potential hazards inherent in brownfield-
generated development.
Second, to many environmental justice advocates, the remedy
for the current disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards
in poor and minority communities is a more equal distribution of
pollution facilities. Thus, environmental justice advocates have
championed legislative moratoriums upon the placement of additional
polluting facilities in areas where Toxic Release Inventory Data
demonstrate an overabundance of polluting facilities already.32
Similarly, advocates have pushed for the implementation of siting
legislation that allocates "locally unwanted land uses" evenly among a
region's neighborhoods. Thus, to the extent brownfields initiatives are
motivated by a desire to prevent the development of greenfields,
advocates might resist the implicit choice of preserving the quality of
suburban, mostly-white neighborhoods at the expense of the
environmental quality of the mostly African-American, urban industrial
neighborhoods.
Finally, the rights-based conception might respond to the
"greenfields" problem with a call for intensifying efforts to force
industry to reduce its total use of hazardous materials and thus the total
amount of hazardous environmental exposure attributable to industry.
To many advocates, the only real solution to the disproportionate
distribution of environmental hazards is pollution prevention.3 For
some advocates, this means changes in the use of technology. For
others, the answer to the problem of disappearing greenfields is to place
obstructions in the path of greenfield development.
32See, e.g., National Environmental Justice Act, H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993)
(requiring the EPA to identify the top 100 counties nationwide with the highest levels of toxic
chemicals and imposing a moratorium on siting toxic substance facilities in those 100
communities).
"See PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 28, § 6 ("Environmental
justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive
materials, and that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the people for
detoxification and the containment at the point of production.").
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B. The "Market-Based" Approach to Achieving Environmental Justice
The speeches, writings and resolutions of those leading the
environmental justice movement point to approaches to achieving
environmental justice other than the rights-based approach. A
prominent alternative approach emphasizes the need for economic
development in poor and minority areas so as to empower such
communities and prevent them from being the target of environmental
degradation.34 This approach might be referred to as the "market-
based" approach because it looks to enhancing the power of
communities in the market as the solution to environmental inequities.
According to the market-based approach to environmental
justice, the pattern of disproportionate exposure to environmental
hazards by poor minority and urban communities will only be broken
when either the residents of such communities obtain the economic
resources to leave contaminated urban neighborhoods or a rise in the
value of urban land begins to attract less polluting businesses. The
market-based approach holds that neither of these can take place, so
long as urban neighborhoods are riddled with abandoned contaminated
sites that operate as a net drag upon the already scarce resources of the
community. Reforms of government industrial facility siting
procedures, so as to prevent sitings that result in disproportionate
impacts upon poor and minority communities, cannot achieve lasting
gains in environmental equity unless the communities possess the
infrastructure, skills, and political organization necessary to attract
more desirable development." Given the economic and political
empowerment of disadvantaged communities, the market-based view
holds that environmental inequities will eventually disappear.
341d. § 12 ("Environmental justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological
policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance with nature, honoring the
cultural integrity of all of our communities"); Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs. Trees,
and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environmental Justice Movement and Community
Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUEs 25, 28 (1993/94)("we argue that
community-based economic development ('CED') has a strong potential to help environmentally
disadvantaged neighborhoods by enabling them to take control of the land and resources in their
communities in order to reduce their vulnerability to disparate environmental impacts").
35Godsil & Freeman, supra note 34, at 28- 29 ("Opposing the discriminatory siting of
hazardous facilities is an important and necessary component of environmental justice. However,
ifthe environmental justice movement is to provide a lasting solution to disparate dumping, it must
not only react to unfair environmental impacts, but must look beyond to issues of long-term
community well-being, including public health and education, environmentally sound economic
development or redevelopment, and inclusive political organization and local land use planning.").
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In contrast to the rights-based approach, the market-based
approach to achieving environmental justice generally supports current
state brownfield laws. To the extent compromises can be made
concerning cleanup and environmental liability in exchange for the
cleanup and redevelopment of such abandoned sites, the community
will be better off. With increased economic resources, the community
will gradually break the pattern of disproportionate exposure to
environmental hazards.
ll. FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE RIGHTS-
BASED AND MARKET-BASED CONCEPTIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
With respect to state brownfield programs, the rights-based and
the market-based approaches to achieving environmentalj ustice appear
to point in opposite directions. The rights-based approach views such
programs suspiciously as legitimating second class environmental
cleanups for hazardous contamination in poor and minority
communities. The market-based approach, on the other hand, would
appear to support brownfield programs as an important step in
improving the economic base of disadvantaged communities, thereby
strengthening their ability to reverse the economic and political
dynamics that have made such communities the targets of
environmental degradation.
The existence of competing conceptions of environmental
justice, such as that represented by the rights-based and market-based
approaches, is probably healthy for the movement overall. No one
group or ideal can claim to speak for the many groups affected by
inequities in environmental protection. The existence of competing
conceptions ensures that the voices of grass-roots groups are not
drowned out by the more powerful factions within the movement.
There is surely sufficient room within the movement for competing
approaches to the achievement of environmental justice ideals.
In this spirit, I would like to suggest an alternative to the rights-
based and market-based approaches to achieving environmental justice
in the specific context of brownfield redevelopment proposals. This
third approach, labeled here as the "pragmatic" approach, supports
departures from a strict rights-based approach to environmental justice
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where the probability of environmental harm is minimal and the
potential economic benefits are large. Such departures, however, are
only justifiable if mechanisms are in place to ensure that departures
from the rights-based approach will result in concrete economic gains
for disadvantaged communities. The pragmatic approach to
environmental justice, in the context of brownfield programs, is
suggested as a recommended approach to achieving environmental
justice goals in the context of brownfield programs, and not as a
replacement for either the rights-based or market-based approaches in
other contexts where they may be more suitable to the achievement of
environmental justice goals.
In the context of brownfields, the pragmatic approach would
likely support the use of less extensive liability and use-based cleanup
standards at contaminated urban sites because such departures from the
CERCLA model may be necessary in order to attract new business
opportunities and to obtain some remedial action at these sites.
However, the pragmatic approach would insist that the government take
more pro-active measures to ensure that brownfield redevelopment
actually results in such opportunities. Accordingly, it is possible to
sketch the requirements that might be necessary for brownfield-related
laws and projects to meet the demands of a pragmatic approach to
environmental justice: (1) completion of government or independent
research studies demonstrating that environmental liability is
responsible in substantial measure for the lack of development of
brownfield sites; (2) that the local community be fully involved in all
decisions made regarding brownfield redevelopment; and (3) that the
local community be afforded real economic opportunities-jobs, job
training, and opportunities for new or spin-off business start-ups-as
part of any redevelopment proposal that reduces cleanup standards or
immunizes any potentially responsible parties. The following
elaborates upon each of these requirements.
1. Empirical Data Establishing a Causal Link Between
Environmental Liability and Abandoned Contaminated
Brownfield Sites
The first requirement of the pragmatic approach is a better
empirical foundation for government brownfield initiatives than what
currently exists. A fundamental question underlying the entire
brownfields debate is the extent to which developers' preference for
greenfields over brownfields is attributable to the potential
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environmental liability associated with brownfields. Developers may
prefer greenfields because of problems associated with urban
development other than environmental liability, such as high crime
rates, deteriorating infrastructure, and poor public services. Similarly,
greenfield sites offer not only relief from potential environmental
liability but also proximity to recreational sites, better schools for
employees, and smaller, less bureaucratic local government oversight
agencies. Finally, underlying racism could cause the developer to
prefer siting in a predominately white suburban community over a
mostly minority urban community. As several commentators have
pointed out, the flight of industry to greenfield sites began long before
the enactment of CERCLA in 1980.36
Few if any empirical studies precisely address this basic
causation question. What little data exists tends to indicate that
brownfields are attributable mainly to larger economic trends rather
than the specter of unlimited environmental liability. For example, one
commentator uses empirical data on employment in different economic
sectors to demonstrate that the migration of industry to greenfields is
the result of the general "deindustrialization" in the U.S. economy (i.e.,
a shift toward a service and away from a manufacturing economy) that
followed World War 11.
37
Obtaining more and better empirical data on this initial
"causation" problem is important to evaluating whether communities
are better off as a result of brownfields initiatives. To the extent
brownfield programs involve compromising more stringent cleanup
standards, more elaborate administrative procedures and more
numerous potentially responsible parties, it is important to know
whether these sacrifices will, in fact, result in additional economic
opportunities in urban areas. If potential environmental liability is in
fact a small deterrent to new urban development relative to crime,
6See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 6 (1997) ("While fears of
environmental liabilities and costs of compliance are factors contributing to Brownfields
abandonment, a cause-effect attribution is in error. These Brownfield sites are the product of many
interrelated phenomena, many of which are unrelated to environmental laws."). See also
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ON
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS4 (1994);
Eisen, supra note 2, at 913.
"Poindexter, supra note 9, at 39-46.
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deteriorating infrastructure, and poor quality urban services, urban
communities may be put at a disadvantage by brownfield initiatives. If
environmental liability is a small factor in industry location decisions,
this means that industries that locate in urban areas would have done so
anyway, regardless of any brownfield incentive they may receive.
Brownfield initiatives may thus result in urban communities sacrificing
better environmental quality without receiving compensating
environmental benefits.3"
2. Public Participation in Brownfields Decision-Making
A second requirement of the pragmatic approach to
environmental justice concerns is that the local community be actively
involved in the decisionmaking process regarding future land uses, the
extent of cleanup at the brownfield site, and any immunities from future
liability offered to the future site owners.
The necessity of involving the affected community in
environmental decisionmaking is a core tenant of environmental
justice.39 Indeed, this only makes sense. The community will have to
live with the environmental and economic trade-offs that result from
brownfields initiatives; it is only right that they be intimately involved
in brownfield decision-making.4" Public participation respects the right
of the community to self-determination.
3 Cf. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race " and
Is It "to the Bottom "?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 351 (1997) (making a similar argument in the
context of state environmental standard-setting, states that relax their environmental standards so
as to attract mobile industries end up worse off than states that maintain stringent standards
because industry location decisions are generally unaffected by the stringency of state
environmental standards and thus states that relax their standards reduce their environmental
quality without obtaining compensating economic benefits).
39See PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 28, § 7 ("Environmental
justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decisionmaking
including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and evaluation."); Exec. Order
No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994-1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1995) (requiring that
federal agencies ensure that public documents related to health and the environment be
understandable and "readily accessible to the public").
4'See NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL (NEJAC) WASTE AND
FACILITY SITING COMMITTEE, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION, AND
BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FORAUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, II.5 (Rev. March 6,1997) (available
at: http:i/www.epa.gov/swerosps/ejhtml-docpubO2.hitm>) ("Community involvement must be
an overarching principle guiding Brownfields Initiatives. The community is uniquely qualified
to make choices over environmental health and clean up.... They should be directly involved in




Although many state voluntary cleanup programs incorporate
community members and other stakeholders as important participants
in brownfield redevelopment decisionmaking, not all brownfield
projects have proceeded with the appropriate involvement of the local
community. For example, according to a recent report by the U.S.
General Accounting Office, the public participation procedures of state
voluntary cleanup programs vary widely, ranging from those that
always provide for formal public comments about cleanups to those that
make no provision for informing the public about the cleanup.4'
Managers of state voluntary cleanup programs justify departures from
the model of mandatory public participation procedures followed under
federal Superfund cleanups as necessary to encourage voluntary
cleanups and appropriate to the lower level of contamination and the
location of the brownfield sites in industrial neighborhoods.42
Communities may also be located in such industrial neighborhoods,
however, and regardless of the size of the site or the degree of
contamination, the decisions made about the brownfield cleanup may
affect their health and future livelihood. Thus, a baseline requirement
of environmental justice would seem to be that the state and/or federal
government must provide meaningful opportunities for the participation
of the affected community with respect to any brownfield initiative that
affects the extent of the site cleanup or the extent of liability of any
potentially responsible party. This may require the creation of new
forms of public participation, other than traditional regulatory public
participation methods, which would be better designed to ensure the
participation of traditionally disenfranchised groups.43
4 GAO, supra note 20, at 43-45.
42
1d. at 44-45.4
1See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998) (arguing that failure to achieve environmental
justice principles is attributable, in part, to inadequacies of traditional regulatory public
participation procedures and suggesting an "environmental justice style" public participation
model to overcome such inadequacies).
1997-98]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
3. Ensuring Increased Economic Opportunities for the
Affected Community
A third basic requirement necessary to meet the pragmatic
conception of environmental justice at brownfield sites is that the
redevelopment project guarantee the affected community increased
economic opportunities in the form of jobs, job training, or concrete
business opportunities." This is necessary for several reasons. First,
provision of such opportunities is necessary to ensure that the affected
community is, in fact, made better off economically by a brownfield
redevelopment project, despite any trade-offs in the degree of cleanup
at the site or the extent of current owner liability for past contamination.
Second, if poor education and lack of training continue to prevail in
urban areas, any urban revitalization effort is doomed to fail. Urban
businesses given ajump-start through brownfield programs cannot last
unless they are able to draw upon an educated and well-trained
workforce.
IV. CONCLUSION
Brownfield redevelopment poses a different set of
environmental justice questions than those traditionally debated.
Rather than asking why poor and minority urban communities are
saddled with a disproportionate number of abandoned contaminated
sites, redevelopment asks what should be done to correct this legacy.
In attempting to characterize the environmental justice concerns with
the application of state voluntary cleanup programs to urban brownfield
sites, it is possible to distinguish between the demands of the rights-
based and market-based approaches that dominate current discussions
of environmental justice. The former is likely skeptical of state
brownfield programs, while the latter would be expected to support
such programs.
In this essay I have sketched the elements of an alternative
approach to environmental justice that is arguably more suitable to the
question ofbrownfield programs. Under this "pragmatic approach," the
trade-offs inherent in state brownfield programs further the goals of
environmental justice so long as such trade-offs are necessary to the
"See NEJAC, supra note 40, at 11.6 ("Brownfields redevelopment must be coordinated
with broader strategies of job creation, training, and career development which produce
demonstrable benefits for the host community. The startup and nurturing of locally-based
businesses as a function of true economic development is a critical requirement.").
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redevelopment of abandoned urban industrial sites, the community is
invited to actively participate in all aspects of the redevelopment
decisionmaking process, and the community reaps tangible economic
gains as a result of the brownfield project.

